PIERCING THE VEIL OF SECRECY IN HIV/AIDS
AND OTHER SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED DISEASES: THEORIES OF PRIVACY AND DISCLOSURE
IN PARTNER NOTIFICATION
http://www.law.duke.edu/
http://www.law.duke.edu/
LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN*
JAMES G. HODGE, JR.
I. INTRODUCTION
At least since their appearance in Western
Europe in the late fifteenth century,1 sexually-transmitted
diseases (STDs), or "venereal diseases" as they were once called,2
have been characterized by a remarkable paradox. Despite their endemic
nature in Europe and North America, STDs were, and still are, a "secret
malady."3 Persons have endeavored to keep their
sexually-transmitted infections hidden from the social world -- from their
sexual partners, families, and communities. At the same time, prevailing
social mores have kept STDs from
[*pg 11]
the public consciousness and consequently have prevented STDs from receiving
public action and effective intervention.
Secrecy nurtures disease because it
provides an environment conducive to the spread of infection. Where the
social construction of sexuality and disease condones secrecy, sex partners
are unaware of the risks,4 and public health authorities cannot
track the epidemic in order to positively intervene. Not surprisingly, one
of the earliest recorded public health strategies for STD prevention was to
pierce the veil of secrecy surrounding these hidden diseases by notifying
sexual partners ("contacts") of infected patients ("index" cases).5
Sexual "contact tracing" was supported by the moral theory that sexual
partners could take precautions and seek medical treatment if the risk of
infection was disclosed.6 Once the risks of infection were
identified, the incidence of STD infection would decline suggestively as
infected persons reduced behaviors that placed them at risk for disease.7
Sexual contact tracing probably was
practiced years before it became a formal means of STD control.8
Originating from the reglementation9 of European prostitutes, the
earliest reference to contact tracing in contagious disease law dates to the
mid-nineteenth century in Europe10 and to the 1930s in the United
States.11 Buttressed by federal financial support and a decade of
state STD laws, "contact epidemiology" became a central public health
strategy in America to combat the syphilis epidemic.12 The
development of a cure for the disease, penicillin,13 in the early
1940s led, however, to significant reductions in the incidence
[*pg 12]
of syphilis. The effectiveness of contact tracing as a public health
practice therefore largely remained unknown despite moral support for the
concept.
From its widespread use during the 1930s,
the notification of sexual partners (with the assistance of public health
authorities) remained an accepted part of the law and practice of STD
control throughout this century.14 This concept of tracking
sexual contacts would later be called "partner notification." Recently, the
concept of partner notification has expanded to formally include a range of
services such as counseling and medical treatment, in addition to
notification. Consequently, a preferred terminology has evolved -- "partner
notification support services" (PNSS).15
In instances where contact tracing did not
traditionally apply, legal reform, driven by moral justifications and based
on theories of tort law, imposed duties on certain persons, generally
infected persons and health care workers (HCWs), to notify others of the
risk of contracting an STD. Often known collectively as the "duty to warn,"
these judicially-imposed, common law obligations subsequently have been
codified by many state legislatures.16 The affirmative "duty to
warn" is comprised of two obligations based on distinct legal foundations:
(1) the duty of infected persons to disclose to partners the risk of
exposure; and (2) the duty of health care professionals to warn partners of
harm resulting from exposure to infected patients.
The social construction of disease,
particularly STDs, perceptively changed during the HIV/AIDS epidemic17
of the 1980s and 1990s. Infected persons (and, to a certain extent, public
health authorities) questioned the theories of disclosure and protection
that justified partner notification. During the AIDS epidemic, secrecy and
individual privacy reemerged as the prevailing social construct of public
health, much as it was in the early days of the syphilis epidemic. As Susan
Sontag writes, "More than cancer, but rather like syphilis, AIDS seems to
foster ominous fantasies about a disease that is a marker of both individual
and social vulnerabilities."18 Within this context, partner
notification has been challenged as an acceptable public health practice or
legally-imposed duty, at
[*pg 13]
least as it relates to a disease like HIV/AIDS, which is deeply private,
socially stigmatizing, and medically incurable.19
In truth, partner notification, whether
applied to traditional STDs or to HIV/AIDS, is a highly complex concept that
cannot be understood without careful consideration of related issues of
public health, ethics, economics, and law. Partner notification has deep
roots in the historical, legal, and philosophical heritage of America. To
public health practitioners, the traditional practice of partner
notification, with its widespread, persistent, and systematic use over time,
justifies its continued implementation. Why then, it is often asked, does
society refrain from fully utilizing one of the most well-established public
health interventions in the HIV/AIDS epidemic?20 Under this
perspective, failure to pursue aggressively partner notification
demonstrates how civil liberties have trumped privacy in HIV/AIDS policy.
These arguments, however, assume that partner notification is effective and
that syphilis and HIV/AIDS are truly analogous diseases.
Despite the use of partner notification in
all of its forms, it has not been systematically examined from legal,
ethical, empirical, and economic perspectives. Based on this analytical
examination, it is apparent that although partner notification is
well-grounded in the legal and moral traditions of America, there exists a
scarcity of empirical and economic evidence demonstrating its
cost-effectiveness. Consequently, alternative models are needed for STD
prevention and control that are both effective and protective of individual
liberties and privacy. In particular, a model of "social network analysis"
that promises to inform those at risk of HIV through focused counseling and
education may be warranted.
Part I explores the various meanings of
partner notification within their historical and legal foundations. Because
partner notification has been used to describe quite different kinds of
intervention, the concept has created policy confusion. Contact tracing, the
patient's duty to disclose, and the health care professional's duty to warn
are described as a prerequisite to a more detailed ethical, economic, and
public health analysis. Part II examines the legal interests involved with
partner notification, particularly contact tracing. The governmental
interests for contact tracing are discussed by framing the constitutional
and statutory justifications for contact tracing from the state and federal
perspectives. Arguments concerning an infected individual's constitutional,
statutory, and common law interests in privacy are discussed along with
anti-discrimination protections for persons infected with STDs --
particularly those infected with HIV. These interests, while important, do
not negate the power of government to implement partner notification. Part
III broadens the systematic evaluation, exploring partner notification from
normative and consequentialist perspectives. One of the powerful reasons to
support partner notification may not necessarily be public health
effectiveness, but simply an ethical claim that persons should be
[*pg 14]
informed about sexual risks despite infringements on the autonomy of
infected persons. Principles of feminism suggest that women should be
informed of demonstrable risks to their health and empowered to protect
themselves. Part IV evaluates the accumulated empirical data about the
efficacy of partner notification, looking at how successful this
intervention has been, under what circumstances it is likely to be most
effective, and whether its effectiveness in a particular setting supports
its efficacy as a national practice. Partner notification also is evaluated
from an economic perspective. The costs of partner notification in
comparison with other public health interventions are analyzed, as well as
the likelihood that the practice creates incentives or disincentives for
avoidance of risk behavior, promotion of healthy behavior, and access to
treatment. Finally, Part V proposes alternative models for partner
notification. In conclusion, a "social network analysis" is supported as
part of a comprehensive prevention strategy for STDs and HIV/AIDS. This
alternative approach can achieve public health objectives with less
intrusion on personal liberty and privacy.
II. THE THREE MEANINGS OF PARTNER
NOTIFICATION: FROM CONTACT TRACING TO THE DUTIES TO DISCLOSE AND WARN
Partner notification is a highly complex
concept. While often simplified to denote the notification of persons who
are at risk of becoming infected with a disease, partner notification has at
least three distinct, if at times overlapping, meanings: (1) contact
tracing; (2) the duty of infected persons to disclose their infection to a
sexual partner; and (3) the duty of health care providers to warn of sexual
and other risks to the partners of their infected patients.
Contact tracing, whose origins can be
traced to the reglementation of prostitutes in sixteenth century Europe, is
characteristically a governmental responsibility undertaken by public health
authorities. The health department typically interviews an infected patient,
called the "index case," who voluntarily discloses the names and locations
of past and present sexual partners. These contacts are then located --
traced -- when possible to notify them of their potential exposure to
infection. The partner is not informed of the name of the index case by
health authorities in an attempt to preserve the confidentiality of the
index case. Medical treatment and personal counseling often are offered to
contacts at the time of notification. For those persons who are infected,
the process is regenerated to determine additional contacts. The principal
objective of contact tracing is to reduce disease transmission by locating
and containing the spread of a given STD within a certain population.21
It seeks to break the chain of transmission by identifying sources through
which others in a given population have become infected. In addition, it
should stem the tide of new infections by medically intervening to treat the
disease and by counseling those infected with STDs to reduce the risk of
transmission by disclosing their infection to partners and engaging in
"protected" sexual activity (e.g., using a condom).
The second meaning of partner notification,
what we term "the duty to disclose," is derived from the legal doctrine of
the "right to know." This "right to know" developed from the social hygiene
movement of the early 1900s
[*pg 15]
and likely was influenced by women's organizations and early principles of
feminism. It developed under tort law that held that a person has a duty of
care toward his sexual partner. This duty may entail an obligation to
disclose an STD to a sexual partner or to reasonably protect the partner
from avoidable health risks. In some instances, a health department or
physician may ask a patient to disclose the STD to his partner, a concept
often referred to as "patient referral" since the patient makes the
disclosure.
The third meaning of partner notification
is derived from a related legal doctrine known as a "duty to warn." Through
conversations with an infected patient, a physician may conclude that
certain persons are at risk of contracting the disease. Under the "duty to
warn," physicians treating a patient for a sexually transmitted disease have
a duty to inform fully foreseeable third parties of their exposure to the
infection, regardless of whether the patient consented to such notification
or the patient's identity was protected.22 This practice is
sometimes known as "provider referral," as the health care professional (or
public health counselor in contact tracing programs) makes the disclosure.
Similar to theories of tort law later
enacted in statutory law, the duty to disclose and the duty to warn have as
their principal objective the protection of unaware individuals from
exposure to disease by others who know of their infectious conditions and
are in control of their actions. The judicial imposition of these duties may
have had the unintended result of decreasing the transmission of infectious
disease among certain populations. The imposition of these duties thus
shared a primary goal with contact tracing: the reduction of infectious
disease transmission in society. In this Part, the broad concept of partner
notification is developed further by examining the theories underlying these
three meanings of partner notification.
[*pg 16]
A. Contact Tracing
1. An Historical Perspective
a) Development of Contact Tracing with a
Focus on Syphilis. The historical origins of contact tracing date back to
the syphilis epidemic beginning at the turn of the sixteenth century in
Europe.23 The appearance of syphilis in Europe has been
attributed to the transport of the disease from the New World by the crew of
Christopher Columbus after his 1492 expedition, although this attribution
has never been confirmed.24 The disease was spread quickly by the
dispersion of the multinational mercenary army of the French ruler, Charles
VIII, after they suffered an outbreak of what the English called "the Great
Pox"25 during the siege of Naples in the Italian Campaign of
1495.26 Syphilis surfaced in Germany, France, and Switzerland in
1495, in Holland and Greece in 1496, in the British Isles in 1497, and in
Russia in 1499.27
By 1530, syphilis28 was
recognized as a sexually transmitted disease that could be controlled by
regulating the sources of infection.29 Early regulations focused
on methods developed to control other epidemic diseases such as leprosy and
the plague. Syphilitics were banished from the community;30 other
communities quarantined those infected in special hospitals created to house
and treat
[*pg 17]
them,31 or simply prohibited them from entering public places or
from associating with certain persons.32
i) Reglementation.
People saw prostitution as a "reservoir" of venereal diseases such as
syphilis. Since prostitution was practiced widely in most of Europe at the
inception of the syphilis epidemic, governments subsequently focused
regulations on prostitutes in an attempt to thwart a known avenue of disease
transmission.33 Prostitutes were expelled from Bologna, Ferrara,
and other cities beginning in 1496.34 A proclamation of the town
council of Aberdeen, Scotland in April 1497 ordered that in "protection from
the disease which had come out of France and strange parts, all light women
desist from their vice and sin of venery and work for their support . . .
[or risk] . . . being branded with a hot iron on their cheek and banished."35
Attempts to control syphilis in Europe also
involved the medical inspection of prostitutes through regulations that came
to be known as reglementation.36 Although early medical treatment
for syphilis was highly toxic and therefore largely ineffective,37
reglementation was emphasized as a way to control the spread of the disease
through the medical inspection and certification of prostitutes. It was
implemented in conjunction with efforts to abolish prostitution completely.38
While efforts to curb prostitution essentially failed, reglementation
[*pg 18]
was practiced until the nineteenth century in Europe.39 Criticism
of government-supported medical inspections of prostitutes, however, was
prevalent. Many viewed the government-funded inspections as the countenance
of prostitution.40 Others questioned the validity of medical
findings derived from the inspection process.41 Although the
efficacy of condoms in blocking the transmission of STDs like syphilis was
accepted medically, few physicians accepted their use due to opposition from
religious and nationalist groups concerned about the concurrent prevention
of pregnancy.42
In the United States, the St. Louis
Experiment of 1870-1874 established a government-sponsored program requiring
the inspection of prostitutes.43 The St. Louis City Council
passed the "Social Evil Ordinance" on July 5, 1870, appointing six
physicians to inspect all registered public women of the city. Prostitutes
afflicted with venereal disease were committed to a special "Social Evil
Hospital" until they were certified as cured. Despite the claim of the City
Health Officer, William Barrett, that the program had "lessened disease,
suffering, and death and reclaimed fallen women,"44 the Missouri
state legislature nullified it in 1874.45 In Illinois, the Board
of Health had the authority to hospitalize any
[*pg 19]
woman suspected of being infected with syphilis and to place placards on her
home stating "suspected VD."46
Private industries also practiced
reglementation. In 1899, the Minnesota Iron Company undertook reglementation
in conjunction with their mining operations in the northern part of the
state.47 A system of thorough and regular examinations was
performed among prostitutes working in parlors located on company property.
Infected women were treated and forbidden to solicit patrons. Male clients
suspected of being infected with an STD were advised to consult a physician
and were expelled from the house of prostitution until their STD status was
ascertained. When suspected males consulted physicians, the men were
questioned about the house where they had contracted their disease. They
were asked to provide the names of the women who may have infected them.
This crude form of contact tracing resulted in a complaint brought against
company parlors and the medical examination of suspected women.48
ii) The Progressive Era.
At the turn of the twentieth century, societal and medical changes
influenced the development of contact tracing. This was the Progressive Era,
an age of social reform in which health care professionals and progressive
social reformers described venereal disease as a destroyer of the family
unit and a social evil.49 Three medical breakthroughs were
crucial: (1) syphilis and gonorrhea were shown to be caused by infectious
organisms transmitted through sexual contact; (2) a reliable diagnostic test
for the diseases was developed by Dr. Adolph von Wassermann in 1907; and (3)
a medication, Salvarsan, was identified as an effective, although still
toxic, treatment for syphilis.50
In the United States, dissidents challenged
the traditional view of venereal disease as a "medical secret" between the
patient and his physician. With enhanced knowledge of the cause and
transmission of STDs like syphilis and gonorrhea, "innocent" victims
(generally married women) of venereal disease became vocal. Patient
confidentiality, primarily among male patients, was considered secondary to
the perceived ethical obligation51 to warn unsuspecting
[*pg 20]
spouses or fiancées about an infected partner.52 Although the
belief remained that "[p]rostitution is responsible to the greatest extent
for the dissemination of venereal diseases,"53 the concept of
contact tracing, which arose from reglementation, was generating more
interest, largely due to the perceived injustices suffered by sex partners
who were unaware of their risk.54
With the return of the United States troops
after World War I and the relative failure of the military to stymie STDs
among soldiers,55 however, federal funding to combat venereal
disease decreased significantly. Despite the lobbying efforts of numerous
women's groups, by 1921 Congress had discontinued appropriations to the
Interdepartmental Social Hygiene Board, which had been created three years
earlier for the purpose of protecting troops from venereal disease.56
The fiscal ravages of the Great Depression further decreased funding for
combating venereal disease. As incidence rates of syphilis infections rose,
many social hygienists blamed the increased prevalence on the relaxed sexual
morality of the 1920s, not on a pattern of decreased public health funding.57
Whether due to changes in sexual morality and behavior or a decrease in
public health funding, the syphilis epidemic in the United States had
worsened.58
[*pg 21]
iii) The Influence of Thomas Parran,
Surgeon General. By 1936, the
New Deal was in full swing. In the spring of that year, President Franklin
Delano Roosevelt appointed Thomas Parran as Surgeon General.59
With a background in preventive medicine and epidemiology, Parran had as a
primary public health goal the control and eradication of the syphilis
epidemic. He advocated the reporting of STD infections to state health
authorities, notification of the partners of infected persons, compulsory
treatment, and isolation of sources of infection when necessary.60
Recognizing that a major barrier to the identification and treatment of
syphilitics had been the moralization of the disease, Parran explained the
disease in terms of costs to the public. It was estimated that fifteen
million dollars was spent annually on the ambulatory care of venereal
patients, and three times that amount was spent on individuals
institutionalized due to insanity, blindness, or paralysis from syphilis.61
After securing substantial federal funding,62 Parran further
educated the public about the syphilis threat,63 organized mass
screening programs for testing,64 and began a national contact
tracing program. His five-point program for controlling syphilis consisted
of case finding,65 prompt therapy at no cost to the patient,
contact
[*pg 22]
tracing and notification, premarital testing66 and prenatal
testing for congenital syphilis,67 and public education.
Studies of the period sought to demonstrate
that contact tracing was an important part of syphilis control programs when
properly executed.68 Two doctors, Dudley C. Smith and William A.
Brumfeld, described the essential qualities of a contact tracing program:
(1) public health interviewers should emphasize the medical aspects of the
disease rather than its moral implications; (2) confidentiality should be
stressed throughout; (3) after the names of sex partners and close
associates are elicited from the patient, the patient should be encouraged
to notify the contacts; (4) public health departments should send a letter
advising each contact to seek medical examination; and (5) legal measures to
compel compliance should only be used as a last resort.69
Parran's efforts in relation to the
syphilis epidemic marked the first time in the United States that formal
case finding and contact tracing were applied to a sexually transmitted
disease on a national scale.70 Before the role of contact tracing
in reducing infection rates could be explored effectively, the use of
penicillin as a potential curative treatment for syphilis had been developed
in 194371 and, by the end of World War II, it was available to
treat the disease.72 The advent of penicillin had a remarkable
effect on the treatment of syphilis. The inci-
[*pg 23]
dence of syphilis infections73 and death rates74
dropped significantly over time. Syphilis, one of the greatest epidemics in
history, finally had been brought under control due in part to an aggressive
public health campaign, including contact tracing, and in part to the timely
availability of penicillin treatment.75 Currently, new cases of
syphilis in the United States have fallen to a forty-year low.76
Although prevalence rates remain unacceptably high in the southeast and
among African-Americans,77 the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services is
hopeful that transmission of the disease can be eliminated in the United
States in the near future.78
b) Development of Contact Tracing with a
Focus on HIV/AIDS. Of course, syphilis would not be the last STD epidemic of
the century. In June 1981, the CDC's Morbidity and Mortality Weekly
Report documented an unusual pneumonia in five homosexual men from Los
Angeles.79 Later identified as the human immunodeficiency virus
(HIV), the HIV/AIDS epidemic has presented new challenges for public health
officials.80 It also has presented chal-
[*pg 24]
lenges similar to those of earlier STDs like syphilis.81 One
obvious similarity between the modern AIDS epidemic and the syphilis
epidemic of the twentieth century is the societal response to the two
diseases. Fear and stigmatization of those infected initially prevailed
during both epidemics.82 The societal response to homosexuals,
prostitutes, and injection drug users (IDUs) infected with HIV strangely is
similar to the treatment of sex syphilitics and prostitutes during the
syphilis epidemic. In contrast, the response to children, hemophiliacs, and
heterosexually-infected persons with HIV is significantly more tolerant,
like society's response to "innocently" infected wives, mothers, and
children with syphilis a century earlier.83
Regardless of the similarities between the
syphilis and HIV epidemics, medical evidence also has shown that they are
intertwined. Common STDs like syphilis, gonorrhea, chlamydia, and genital
herpes are known to increase the risk of HIV infection.84 The
association between STD infection and HIV may be due as much to risky
behaviors, including drug use,85 of persons likely to become
infected with multiple STDs, in addition to the immune suppressed state of
those infected with common STDs.86 It only can be guessed as to
the course of HIV policy had these findings been known earlier. Almost from
the inception of the HIV/AIDS epidemic, issues of patient confidentiality
and funding87 in the context of contact tracing reemerged. "HIV
exceptionalism,"88 suggesting that public health activities for
HIV were markedly less aggressive than for other STDs, became hotly debated.
[*pg 25]
The public health response to AIDS focused
on individual responsibility.89 The use of contact tracing
enraged gay rights organizations,90 civil rights groups,91
and even some public health officials.92 Although some states
tried to establish mandatory partner notification programs,93
most programs and state educational initiatives centered on individuals
protecting themselves from infection.94 Public health officials
struck a balance between maintaining patient confidentiality and ensuring
that known parties were informed of possible exposure to HIV.95
As a result, officials attempting to control the epidemic emphasized the
personal obligation of the infected to notify their past and future
partners.96
2. The Contemporary Practice of Contact
Tracing. Contact tracing is primarily the responsibility of state health
departments. Differing needs of individual communities render contact
tracing suitable to
[*pg 26]
state and local control.97 While no federal system of partner
notification exists, the CDC, as part of the Department of Health and Human
Services, provides funding to state and local health departments to perform
a variety of testing, screening, and partner notification services related
to the HIV epidemic.98 As a condition of funding eligibility,
state health departments are required to implement partner notification
programs according to CDC guidelines.99 Under this system,
"standards, procedures, and practices vary widely from state to state."100
Recently, the CDC proposed new parameters for partner notification, or what
it calls "partner notification support services" (PNSS).101 These
proposals would require federally-funded contact tracing programs to provide
a comprehensive set of supplemental services, including testing, medical
treatment, and counseling, in addition to notification assistance.102
While states, therefore, are not federally
mandated to provide partner notification services,103 states that
choose to accept federal funding for such programs must adhere to CDC
guidelines regarding partner notification. In this way, the CDC guidelines
establish national criteria controlling the operation of federally-funded
contact tracing programs operated by state and local governments. The
guidelines allow public health authorities to practice two primary models of
partner notification -- patient referral and provider referral.
An additional model known as conditional referral is a hybrid
combination of the two,104 which often prevails in modern
practice.
With patient referral, index
patients, who are identified through testing at public health clinics,
physician referrals, or through contacts of other infected persons, are
asked to contact their sex partners and IDUs with whom they have
[*pg 27]
shared syringes and needles.105 A public health official assists
the index patient by providing counseling, education, contact cards, and
telephone or mail reminders to the patient.106 Patient referral
programs provide no assurance that contacts are actually notified, little
control over the quality of the information actually conveyed, and no
confidentiality protection for the identity of the index patient.107
Provider referral
programs switch the responsibility for
notification to trained public health personnel who locate contacts based on
names, descriptions, and addresses provided by index patients.108
Information regarding their exposure, possible infection, and treatment is
provided to partners in a counseled environment, preferably during a
face-to-face meeting between the contact and a public health professional.109
The confidentiality of the index patient is protected by declining to reveal
the patient's name to contacts,110 although in many instances,
contacts are aware of the source of their exposure through their own
deduction or other means.111 Provider referral programs are more
expensive to administer than patient referral programs because of a
significant outlay of state personnel and resources. The confidentiality of
index patients, however, is protected better through such programs, as is
the quality of the information conveyed to contacts. In addition, there
exists a greater potential that contacts will be informed.112
Conditional referral
occurs when public health personnel obtain the names and other information
about the index patient's contacts, but allow the patient a period of time
to notify them directly.113 If the contacts are not informed
within the designated time period, a public health worker informs them of
their exposure without revealing the index patient's identity.114
As a hybrid model, conditional referral programs share many of the same
weaknesses and benefits of patient referral and provider referral programs
mentioned above.
Many states statutorily have authorized
public health authorities at the state or local level to utilize contact
tracing as part of its comprehensive public health strategy for controlling
STDs, including HIV/AIDS. While the law of these jurisdictions varies, Table
A below summarily charts the statutory sources and general application of
these laws.
[*pg 28
-32]
TABLE A - STATUTORY AUTHORIZATION FOR
CONTACT TRACINGa
|
State |
Disclosures for
contact tracing?b |
Statutory Source(s) |
Classification of
Programsc |
Specific Diseases
Coveredd |
|
Alabama |
Y |
ALA. CODE §
22-11A-38(a), (d) (1997) |
PR |
CD |
|
Alaska |
N |
- |
- |
- |
|
Arizona |
Y |
ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 36-664(B)(3), (K) (West 1993) |
PR
PR |
CD
HIV |
|
Arkansas |
N |
- |
- |
- |
|
California |
Y |
CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 121015(d) (West 1996) |
PR |
HIV |
|
Colorado |
Y |
COLO. REV. STAT. §
25-4-402(3) (1997) |
PR |
STD |
|
Connecticut |
Y |
CONN. GEN. STAT. §§
19a-215(c), -584(a) (1997) |
PR
PR |
CD
HIV |
|
Delaware |
N |
- |
- |
- |
|
District of
Columbia |
Y |
D.C. CODE ANN. §
6-117(a)-(b) (1995) |
PR |
CD |
|
Florida |
Y |
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§
381.004(3)(e)(5), .26(1), .26(3)(West 1993 & Supp. 1998) |
PaR
PR |
HIV
STD |
|
Georgia |
Y |
GA. CODE ANN. §
24-9-47(h)(3)(B) (1995) |
PR |
HIV |
|
Hawaii |
Y |
HAW. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 325-101(a)(4)-(5) (Michie 1996) |
PR |
HIV,
AIDS |
|
Idaho |
Y |
IDAHO CODE §
39-610(2) (1993) |
PR |
HIV,
HBV |
|
Illinois |
Y |
410 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 325/5(a), /5.5 (West 1997) |
PR
CR |
STD
HIV |
|
Indiana |
Y |
IND. CODE ANN. §
16-41-7-4(c) (Michie 1993) |
PR |
HIV,
AIDS,
HBV |
|
Iowa |
Y |
IOWA CODE ANN. §
141.6 (West 1997) |
CR |
HIV |
|
Kansas |
N |
- |
- |
- |
|
Kentucky |
N |
- |
- |
- |
|
Louisiana |
Y |
LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 40:1300.14E(1)(a) (West 1992) |
PR |
HIV |
|
Maine |
N |
- |
- |
- |
|
Maryland |
Y |
MD. CODE ANN.,
HEALTH-GEN. I § 18-337(b) (1994 & Supp. 1997) |
CR |
HIV |
|
Massachusetts |
N |
- |
- |
- |
|
Michigan |
Y |
MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 333.5114a (West 1992) |
PR |
HIV |
|
Minnesota |
Y |
MINN. STAT. ANN. §
144.4172(4) (West 1989) |
PaR |
CD |
|
Mississippi |
Y |
MISS. CODE ANN. §
41-23-1(9) (1993 & Supp. 1997) |
PR |
AIDS,
CD |
|
Missouri |
Y |
MO. ANN. STAT. §
191.656.2(1)(d) (1996) |
PR |
HIV |
|
Montana |
Y |
MONT. CODE ANN. §
50-16-1009(3) (1997) |
CR |
HIV |
|
Nebraska |
N |
- |
- |
- |
|
Nevada |
Y |
NEV. REV. STAT. §
441A.220.5 (1996 & Supp. 1997) |
PR |
CD |
|
New Hampshire |
Y |
N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 141-F:9 (1996) |
PR |
HIV |
|
New Jersey |
Y |
N.J. STAT. ANN. §
26:4-41 (West 1996) |
PR |
STD |
|
New Mexico |
Y |
N.M. STAT. ANN. §
24-1-9.3 (Michie 1997) |
PaR |
STD |
|
New York |
Y |
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH
LAW § 2782.2(c), .4 (McKinney 1993) |
PR |
HIV |
|
North Carolina |
Y |
N.C. GEN. STAT. §
130A-143(4), (8) (1995) |
PR |
HIV,
AIDS,
CD |
|
North Dakota |
Y |
N.D. CENT. CODE §
23-07.5-05.1(f) (1991 & Supp. 1997) |
PR |
HIV |
|
Ohio |
Y |
OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3701.241(3), .243(B)(1)(a) (Banks- Baldwin 1994) |
PR |
HIV,
AIDS |
|
Oklahoma |
Y |
OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 63, § 1-502.2(A)(4) (West 1997) |
PR |
CD |
|
Oregon |
Y |
OR. REV. STAT. §
433.045(3) (1992) |
n/a |
HIV |
|
Pennsylvania |
Y |
35 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 7605(e)(1)-(2) (West 1993) |
PaR |
HIV |
|
Rhode Island |
Y |
R.I. GEN. LAWS §
23-11-10 (1996) |
PR |
STD |
|
South Carolina |
Y |
S.C. CODE ANN. §§
44-29-90, -146 (Law Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 1997) |
PR |
STD,
HIV,
AIDS |
|
South Dakota |
N |
- |
- |
- |
|
Tennessee |
Y |
TENN. CODE ANN. §§
68-10-102, -115 (1996); |
PR
PR |
STD
HIV |
|
Texas |
Y |
TEX. CODE ANN. §
81.051 (West 1992 & Supp. 1998) |
PR |
HIV |
|
Utah |
Y |
UTAH CODE ANN. §
26-6-3.5(1)(b) (1995 & Supp. 1997) |
PR |
HIV,
AIDS |
|
Vermont |
N |
- |
- |
- |
|
Virginia |
Y |
VA. CODE ANN. §
32.1-36.1(A)(11) (Michie 1997) |
PR |
HIV |
|
Washington |
Y |
WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 70.24.022, .105(2)(g) (West 1992) |
PR
PR |
STD
HIV |
|
West Virginia |
Y |
W. VA. CODE §
16-3C-3(d) (1998) |
PR |
HIV |
|
Wisconsin |
Y |
WIS. STAT. ANN. §
252.12(2)(1) (West 1991 & Supp. 1997) |
PaR |
HIV |
|
Wyoming |
Y |
WYO. STAT. ANN. §
35-4-133(c) (Michie 1997) |
PR |
STD |
|
Notes:
a. The Table
summarizes those jurisdictions which have enacted statutory law
explicitly providing for or allowing contact tracing by state or local
governments. It does not chart sources of administrative or common law
which may allow for the use of contact tracing in jurisdictions which
have not otherwise enacted statutory law authorizing its
implementation.
b. Yes [Y]; No [N].
c. Provider
Referral [PR]; Patient Referral [PaR]; Conditional Referral [CR].
d. Contagious or
Communicable Diseases in general [CD]; Sexually-transmitted Diseases
in general [STD]; Human Immunodeficiency Virus [HIV]; Acquired Immuno-deficiency
Syndrome [AIDS]; Hepatitis B [HBV].
|
Consider an example of a contact tracing
program as an illustration.115 A local health department begins a
contact tracing program with the names of 100
[*pg 33]
persons (index cases) known to be infected with a certain STD. Based on CDC
sex partner indices, each index case will on average report 1.8 total sex
partners116 for an aggregate total of 180 sex partners who are
potentially identifiable. Of the 100 index cases, half are either married or
engaged in a long-term, primarily monogamous sexual relationship. The
identity of the marital or other monogamous partner either is already known
or is easily obtainable by the health department without the assistance of
the index patient. An estimated 50 sexual contacts of the index case are
thus readily identifiable. This leaves 130 additional sexual partners whose
identities are unknown. The goal of the contact tracing program is to
identify, locate, and contact these 130 persons.
Accomplishing this objective requires the
participation of as many index cases as possible. Statistics based on a
study of 25 HIV-positive women in New Jersey117 reveal that 68%
of index cases would voluntarily provide the names of their sex partners to
health authorities provided their own identity was not revealed to the
contacts. Only 20% of these same index cases would participate, however, if
their identities were revealed. As these data indicate, maintaining the
confidentiality of index cases is vital to the ability of authorities to
track contacts.118 If the program in question is based solely on
patient referral where confidentiality is not protected, authorities may
expect the participation of only 20% of the index cases, or 20 persons,
which in turn would locate approximately 20% of the remaining 130
unidentified, potential contacts, or twenty-six persons. Thus, a patient
referral program would potentially locate a total of 76 contacts (50
spouses/long-term partners + 26 other sex partners voluntarily notified), or
42% of all 180 identifiable sex partners.119 Of those persons
reached, each would know the source through which they were exposed to
infection.
A conditional referral program may fare
slightly better than one based solely on patient referral since the health
department guarantees that it will not disclose the identities of index
cases. The premise of a conditional referral program is, however, that index
cases will notify their sexual contacts directly. Only when index cases have
failed to do so would health authorities assist. Since the confidentiality
of index cases ultimately is not guaranteed, many index cases will not
participate voluntarily.
Only through the implementation of a
provider referral program can health authorities assure index cases that
their identities will not be revealed. Of course, this does not mean that
some contacts will not guess correctly the identities of the index cases.
Regardless, where 68% of the index cases voluntarily participate with such
programs as statistics suggest, approximately 88 of the remaining 130
unidentified potential contacts would be named. A provider referral program
thus potentially could locate a total of 138 contacts (50 spouses/long-term
partners + 88 other partners voluntarily disclosed), or 77% of all 180
identifiable sex partners.120 Of these contacts, only persons who
shared sexual or drug relations solely with the index case in the past
several years
[*pg 34]
would know for certain the source through which they were infected or were
in danger of being infected. Since confidentiality is preserved, many
contacts remain unaware of the source of exposure, although they would be
counseled to practice safe sex with every partner to prevent future
exposures.121
Contact tracing in its traditional sense
thus arose from a history of government control of STDs. As one form of
partner notification, contact tracing represents a traditional activity of
the state to protect the public from epidemic diseases. The voluntary nature
of participation is a principal feature of traditional contact tracing.
Maintaining the confidentiality of index patients, while not a central
feature of patient referral and conditional referral systems, is important
in encouraging patients to volunteer their partners' names.
B. Duty of Infected Persons to Disclose
While the duties of infected persons to
disclose and health care workers (HCWs) to warn partners of exposure to STDs
share characteristics with contact tracing, particularly the quintessential
feature of notifying sexual partners, significant differences between these
duties and contact tracing exist. The differences between the meanings of
partner notification confuse policy formulation and mar societal conceptions
of contact tracing programs. In this Part the history of the common law duty
of infected persons to disclose their infectious condition to their partners
is traced and a modern description of the duty to disclose is provided. In
the next Part, the duty of HCWs to warn the sexual or needle-sharing
partners of their infected patients is explained further.
The underlying tort concept of "duty" is
important to understanding the differences between the three meanings of
partner notification. A duty is a legal obligation to conform to a certain
standard of conduct towards another person.122 Of the many
factors that determine the existence of a duty, the most important is the
foreseeability of risk of harm to another.123 If it is
foreseeable that a person's behavior will cause harm to another, that person
has a duty to take reasonable
[*pg 35]
steps or "due care" to avoid such behavior.124 In the context of
the transmission of infectious diseases, "due care" requires at a minimum
disclosing one's condition to others at risk of exposure, including sexual
or needle-sharing partners.125 The breach of the duty to disclose
or warn constitutes tortious, and occasionally criminal, conduct when it
results in harm to another.
The duties to disclose and to warn
represent a more serious, obligatory side to partner notification. Whether
imposed judicially or statutorily, they are grounded in the obligation to do
no harm to others. In combination, they require that certain persons,
including those infected with STDs and the HCWs treating them, inform
foreseeable, unknowing sexual partners of the risks of exposure to
[*pg 36]
infection.126 The impetus of these duties is the protection of
individuals, not necessarily the concern for public health as is the focus
of contact tracing.
Since these duties traditionally have been
imposed on individuals, they generally must be carried out by the
individuals upon whom they fall, as opposed to being carried out by
government health officials who assist with contact tracing among
volunteering individuals. The duties do not present voluntary choices left
to the discretion of infected persons and HCWs127 since the
failure to notify persons at risk when required to do so may result in civil
liability and criminal sanctions.128 In addition, unlike at least
one form of contact tracing (provider referral), the satisfaction of these
duties generally breaches the confidentiality of infected persons directly,
when imposed on the patient, or indirectly, when imposed on HCWs. Under
either circumstance, the identity of the infected person is important to
fulfilling the duty: persons are entitled to know the individual source of
danger of which they are unaware.129
The duty of infected persons to disclose to
their partners the threat of STD exposure originates in the general duty to
warn of contagious diseases (which itself is based on the duty not to harm
others).130 Since the turn of the century,131 civil
and criminal courts have imposed duties to disclose on infected persons
[*pg 37] who are aware of the danger
of infection.132 Persons with contagious diseases like whooping
cough133 or tuberculosis,134 or their guardians,135
were required to warn others with whom they came into contact. The same duty
has been imposed on other responsible parties, including innkeepers,136
parents,137 landlords,138 and most notably,
physicians,139 when it is foreseeable that preventable harm will
fall on identifiable third parties.140
[*pg 38]
The judicial origins of the duty to
disclose STDs can be traced to 1866.141 Early claims, often
brought by aggrieved wives against infected husbands, usually were barred on
the basis of the interspousal immunity doctrine.142 The
interspousal immunity doctrine arose from the legal fiction that recognized
a husband and his wife as a single identity. As a result, it was considered
morally and conceptually objectionable to permit tort suits between spouses.143
With the adoption of Married Women's Acts into state law, wives began to
achieve separate legal identity from their husbands as states abrogated the
doctrine.144 Although criminal liability for transmission of an
STD from a husband to his wife was imposed in the United States as early as
1917,145 it was not until 1920 that a wife was allowed to bring a
civil cause of action against her husband for the transmission of an STD.146
From its origin in common law, the modern
duty to disclose requires infected persons to notify persons exposed to
infection, whether sexually or through the sharing of drug injection
equipment among IDUs.147 Spouses and other sexual partners148
can recover tort damages for breaches of this duty149
[*pg 39]
through actions brought on the varied bases of assault or battery,150
fraud or misrepresentation,151 infliction of emotional distress,152
seduction,153 and negligence.154
A crucial issue is whether it is reasonably
foreseeable that sexual contact or needle sharing might harm one's partner.155
In general, a "reasonable person" who knows or should know that they have an
STD must communicate this knowledge to any sexual partner prior to sexual
relations.156 The knowledge of infection can be actual or
constructive. 157 In general, "[a]ll courts agree that if
[*pg 40]
one has actual knowledge of infection with an STD, he or she at the very
least has a duty to warn his or her sexual partner."158
Yet, in some instances, imposing a duty to
disclose may be difficult where an infected person is unaware that he is
infected since he is not symptomatic.159 Since some sexually
transmitted infections manifest immediate symptoms, it is reasonable to
impute knowledge of infection, even though a person actually may not have
been diagnosed as infected, and thus impose a duty to disclose.160
Constructive knowledge of one's infection thus is sufficient to impose
liability. To hold otherwise and require actual knowledge may provide an
incentive for some persons to avoid diagnosis and treatment in order to
avoid knowledge of their own infection.
Some STDs like HIV have long latency
periods in which persons may not know that they are infected for months or
years.161 HIV has caused courts and commentators to struggle to
define when the duty to disclose arises.162 As one court
questioned, "at what level of knowledge of the HIV virus should a [person]
foresee potential harm to [his sexual partner] such that [he] acquires a
duty to act as a 'reasonably prudent person', as well as to disclose [his]
knowledge of the HIV virus to [his sexual partner]."163 To date,
courts have been reticent to impose
[*pg 41]
a duty based solely on a person's sexual history.164 Rather, the
person must have had some reasonable basis for knowing their infected
status, such as a positive test result, symptomology, or knowledge that a
previous sexual partner was infected.
C. Duty of Health Care Workers to Warn
1. Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of
California. If an infected individual refuses or fails to inform his
partners, HCWs with knowledge of the patient's sexually-transmitted
infection and knowledge of the patient's refusal to notify others at risk
may have a duty to warn the partners. At common law there was no affirmative
obligation to act for the protection of others.165 Courts have
crafted exceptions to this rule, however, based on public policy
considerations, and have imposed a duty on HCWs to warn their patient's
partners of the patient's infectious condition.166 While the duty
of HCWs to warn shares its origins with the same contagious disease line of
cases through which courts developed the duty of infected persons to
disclose, it was recognized most famously in Tarasoff v. Regents of the
University of California.167
In Tarasoff, the California Supreme
Court held that mental health professionals have a duty to warn third
parties of threats of violence by the professional's patients:168
"When a therapist determines, or pursuant to the standards of his profession
should determine, that his patient presents a serious danger of violence to
another, he incurs an obligation to use reasonable care to protect the
[*pg 42] intended victim against
such danger."169 The Tarasoff decision has been accepted
widely by courts in the United States.170 Its holding has been
extended in several jurisdictions to apply to certain medical professions or
to HCWs in general.171 As a result, a HCW who is aware of a
foreseeable danger posed by his patient172 may have a duty to
instruct and advise persons likely to come into contact with the patient; in
most instances the person at risk is an existing sexual or needle-sharing
partner.173 Even where a HCW is unaware of the existence of such
partners, a HCW's failure to warn infected patients of the potential to
infect others is actionable negligence when brought by a third party
infected by the patient.174
Exercising the duty to warn necessarily
requires a HCW to inform partners of the name of the patient who poses a
danger to them. As a result, such notification constitutes a breach of the
confidential relationship shared between doctors and patients. Most states
recognize a common law duty of confidentiality applying to certain health
care professions.175 Whether derived from the ethical obligations
of HCWs or the contractual nature of the doctor-patient relationship,
[*pg 43]
patient confidentiality is justified by the need to develop a trusting
relationship with one's physician in order to facilitate information
exchange.176 Patie |